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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN HELLSTROM, dlb/a
DIESEL SERVICE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
D. A. OSGUTHORPE,
Defendant and Appellant.

I
I

1

Case No.
\ 11462

I

Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's brief under "Disposition in Lower
Court" states that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary ·
Judgment was granted by the Court "without even considering the Court file or the depositions." There is no
support whatever for this bald assertion. The file shows
that the Motion for Summary Judgment was opposed
by appellant's affadivit, that the matter was fully
1

argued on November 15, depositions introduced, that a
proposed Summary Judgment was served on November
18 and signed by the Court on November 20. This is
all recited in the summary judgment ( R-33) and appe).
lant cites no support for his charge.
Appellant's Statement of Facts, Page 2, states that
when Clarence Osguthorpe picked up the truck he signed
"a blank repair order form." The affidavit of Clarence
Osguthorpe ( R-30) identifies the document attached
to plaintiff's reply as being the document he signed but
states that only the amounts were not on the document
at that time.
Appellant's brief states that defendant "objected"
to the cost of repairs. His deposition (Page 12) states
that the plaintiff "explained why it had run more money
than what he had said" and does not contain any word
of objection or dissatisfaction.
Appellant's brief then states that after the volun·
tary repairs made by plaintiff in June, 1967, the truck
"still did not perform satisfactorily" but there is no
statement by either Clarence Osguthorpe or the defendant that this was ever reported to the plaintiff and the
plaintiff testified that no complaint was made to him
subsequent to the work done in June, 1967 (Hellstrom
deposition, Page 30).
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts then states that "at
no time did the parties agree on any settled amount for
the work" which is the basis of respondent's claim that
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as a matter of law there was an agreement through the
furnishing of the full statement and the payment on
account which is not denied.
Appellant's brief (Page 3) then states that defendant denied the authority of Clarence Osguthorpe to
bind him on a contract providing for attorney's fees
and interest. Defendant at no time denied the authority
of Clarence Osguthorpe, and indeed intimated that he
was probably an owner of the business when he said
in his deposition (Page 21) that "'Ve always go by
Osguthorpe Brothers" and stated only that he was "not
willing to be bound by" a document which was not
filled in. ( Osguthorpe deposition, Page 15). Clarence
Osguthorpe appears to have an ownership interest from
the language of his affidavit. (R-31).
At the top of Page 4 appellant points out that the
Clarence Osguthorpe deposition "had not been filed
in the Court and is not even a part of the record on
appeal." The affidavit of Clarence Osguthorpe is a
part of the record (R-20 to 31), having been filed on
the day of the argument of the Motion for Summary
Judgment, apparently in lieu of the deposition. Counsel
for defendant stated that he did not have the deposition
of Clarence Osguthorpe filed "and that is why I am
introducing this affidavit at this time." (R-56). Counsel
for plaintiff then stated that he had copies and could
supply one and Mr. Burton stated that there were not
any corrections and chose to rest on the affidavit rather
than produce the deposition and when counsel for plain-
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tiff stated that the affidavit agrees with the deposition
the defendant made no further comment. (R-57).
At Page 8 appellant argues that information as
to the plaintiff's markup on parts and outside work was
not before the Court (Appellant's brief, Page 8). That
is, of course, because appellant wrote his brief without
reading a transcript of the proceedings on November 15,
1967 from which it plainly appears that this information
was elicited and was before the Court. ( R-50 to 55).
And at Pages 10 and 11 of his brief appellant
argues that there was nothing before the Court on the
matter of attorney's fees. This matter was also covered
and appears in the supplemental transcript. (R-55 to
57).

POINTS O:F ARGUMENT
I. Is this a case for summary judgment?

2. Is the price of the work established?

A. On the theory of account stated?
B. As being reasonable?
3. Is plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees?
A. Is the agreement sufficient?
B. Is the proof sufficient?
4. Was interest properly allowed?

4

ARGUMENT
1.

Is this a case for summary judgment?

Appellant argues that summary judgment should
not be granted to prevent a party from presenting his
evidence except when it appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact (Brief, Pages 17 and 19). We
agree. It should be observed here that depositions of the
parties were taken as well as the deposition of Clarence
Osguthorpe and in lieu of producing his deposition
defendant filed an affidavit as to the participation of
Clarence Osguthorpe in the transaction. Nowhere does
the defendant point out any evidence or type of evidence
which he desires to present more fully than was covered
in the deposition or the affidavit.
In other words, it appears that by the use of depositions and affidavits both parties were able to present
their evidence without a trial. Is there a genuine issue
as to a material fact?
Respondent recognizes that the rule is that on a
motion for summary judgment the evidence will be
viewed by the reviewing court most favorably to the
loser. Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah
2d 30, 395 P 2d 62. The basic consideration still is ·
whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Larsen vs.
Christensen, 21 U 2d 219, 443 P 2d 402. The mere
assertion that a fact issue exists does not preclude the
granting of summary judgment. Foster vs. Steed, 19
U 2d 435, 432 P 2d 60; Leininger vs. Stearns-Roger
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Manufacturing Company, 17 U 2d 37, 404 P 2d 33.
Furthermore, the unresolved issue of fact must be an
issue which must be resolved by the Court to determine
the legal rights of the parties. FMA Finanical Corpo,
ration vs. Build, Inc., 17 U 2d 80, 404 P 2d 670.
In his brief the appellant contends there are issues
of fact on the following matters:
( 1) There was an agreement between the parties
for repairs at a specified price. (Page 6)
( 2) The work was to be done at reasonable costs
with an estimate by respondent. (Page 8}

(3) When was the account past due? (Page 9)

( 4) There is a dispute as to reasonable attorney's
fees. (Page 10)
( 5) There is no agreemnt as to the amount due
and owing. (Page 12)

( 6) Defendant contends he has not accepted the
work. (Page 13)
(7) Did Clarence Osguthorpe have authority to
sign the repair bill? (Page 14)

(I) There was no agreement between the parties
for repairs at a specified price.
Defendant in his deposition gave as the figures of
the estimate $1,800 to $1,900 initially and then increased
that by $400 to $500 with a statement attributable to
plaintiff that "I'm sure I can repair it for this amount"
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and the defendant's response, "We don't want to spend
any more money than this." ( Osguthorpe Deposition,
Page 11). This still is an estimate and not a contract
and the total of $2,500 is within a reasonable range
of the final figure on the billing of $2,784.57.
( 2) The work was to be done at reasonable costs
with an e5timate by respondent.

This is a corollary of the first statement and is
stated separately by appellant (Pages 6 and 7). The
respondent testified as to the number of hours spent
on the truck and that he scaled that down as he usually
does (Hellstrom Deposition, Pages 22 & 32-33) and
that his mark-up on parts and outside work was the
standard practice in the industry. (R-51 & 54).
Whether the charges made were reasonable is an
issue raised by the allegation in the Complaint that the
work was to be at the ''reasonable and agreed price of
$2,784.57" which was put in issue by the answer. But
as the evidence developed, it was that the original
invoice or statement was delivered to Clarence and
then to the defendant ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page
13) and after the June repairs a further statement was
delivered to the defendant ( Osguthorpe Depositi_on,
Page 16-17) and that thereafter a payment of $500.00 ·
was made ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page 17) which
amounted, in the contemplation of law, to an agreed
balance of the nature of an account stated.
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(3) When was the account

pa~t

due?

Appellant's own authority at Page 9 is that tl
account was due immediately, in the absence of a1
other circumstances. There were no other circumstanc1
here and respondent gave appellant the benefit of U
doubt by considering the account due following the corr
pletion of repairs to make the job satisfactory an
accepted, there having been no further complaints. Fr
convenience respondent used the 10th of the followin.
month as the due date with the statement "No lah
than July 10, 1967". Appellant points to no fact whic
raises an issue as to this.
( 4) There is a dispute as to reasonable attorney

fee.
Appellant did not have the supplemental tran
script before him and the stipulation of counsel seem
to cover the necessity of proof on this point under tli
authority cited by appellant on Page 11 of his briel
( 5) There is no agreement as to the amount dn,

and owing.
This is raised by appellant at Page 12 of his brie:
and is actually answered under points (I) and (2
considered here. The law is argued under point 2.

( 6) Defendant contends he has not accepted t!1

work.

Plaintiff testified that following the repairs ir
June he had no complaint as to the truck and the dt
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fendant acknowledged this and attempted to justify
his failure to make complaint by saying he was not
satisfied with the treatment he had received (Hellstrom
Deposition, Page 30, Osguthorpe Deposition, Page
18). The fact remains uncontroverted that the work
was accepted and no further complaint was made.
( 7) Did Clarence Osguthorpe have authority to
sign the repair bill?

Clarence Osguthorpe delivered the truck to the
plaintiff and this was known to the defendant. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 9 & 13). Proper delivery of
the car was made to the person who had brought it in
with authority confirmed by defendant's conversations
with the plaintiff.
Defendant received the original bill with the signature of his brother on it and the agreement to pay
attorney's fees. (Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13, 15,
16) and then received a similar bill with the June repairs
on it and the final balance ( Osguthorpe Deposition,
Pages 16, 17) . His only explanation was that he did
not read the agreement. (Deposition, Page 16). Defendant was charged with knowledge of the agreement
and at no time denied the authority of his brother.
2. Is the price of the work established?

A. On the theory of account stated?
Appellant challenges use of the phrase "account
stated" on Pages 12 and 13 of his brief. Respondent
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took the position in the Motion for Summary Judgment
that the balance here is established as being in the nature
of an account stated. It is true that there was riot a
large number of transactions, but there were two transactions, the main repair job in J auuary and .February,
1967 and the additional repairs in June, 1967, followed
by the rendering of a com1Jlete bill following which and
in October 1967 there was a payment on the account
of $500.00. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13, 15 and
17).

Following the quotation made by appellant at Page
12 of his Brief from Section 21 of 1 Am J ur 2d on
Accounts and Accounting appears this:

"It is now the accepted rule that an account
stated may be based upon a single item, or upon
an account in ·which all the items are on one side.
To effect an account stated the outcome of the
negotiations must be the recognition of a balance
due from one of the parties to the other with a
promise,
expressed or implied, to pay that bal,.
ance.
and at Section 24 it is stated:
"If the statement is in writing, it need not Le
signed; it is sufficient if it has been examine~
and accepted by both parties, and acceptance o~
the account may be implied from circumstances.

and at Section 28:
"An account stated predisposes an absolute
acknowledgmell or admission of a eertain sum
due, or an adjustment of aceounts between the
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parties, the striking of a balance, and an assent
to the correctness of the balance, which assent
assent may be either expressed or implied."
and a partial payment has been regarded as an implied
assent or promise to pay the balance.
The seller of the service, having rendered a complete statement, the assent of the defendant is to be
found both in retaining the statement without complaint, and in his having made a payment on account.
Harris vs. Merlino, 137 N.J. 717, 61 A 2d 276 at 279;
l Am J ur 2d, Accounts and Accounting, Section 24;
Restatement of Contracts, Section 422 ( 1) ; Williston
on Contracts Revised Edition, Section 90 B.
The Motion for Summary Judgment states that
there is no substantial issue as follows: "8. After rendition of the bill to the defendant in the amount of
$2,784.57 and after the charges of $6.75 in June the
defendant on October 6, 1967 paid $500.00 on the
account leaving a balance of $2,291.32." (R-27)
The defendant in his deposition stated that after
the work was done he received the bill and discussed the
amount of it with the plaintiff. There was no statement
that the bill was disputed or challenged in any way
and the only further comment was that the truck was
not operating satisfactorily, which was subsequently
remedied. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13 to 14).

B. As being reasonable?
Plaintiff didn't make any point of the reasonableness of the charges, since the rendering of the account
11

and the acknowledgment of its correctness by the payment was the essence of his case. Hut in the deposition
of the defendant Mr. Osguthorpe stated that he was
not an authority "on the price of truck parts" or as
to charges for labor. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page
18).
In the deposition taken of the plaintiff in response
to questions asked by the defendant plaintiff testified
that has labor charges were his standard charges (Page
22), that he charged "the going rate at that itme" (Page
22), that the total hours were 112 and that these were
adjusted to 98 (Pages 32 and 33) , and when he was
compelled to answer questions as to mark-ups on parts
and on outside work the plaintiff testified that he used
standard and competitive mark-ups (R-51, Lines 24
to 26, R-54, Lines 13 to 16).
And again, the payment of a part of a completed
statement forecloses the issue as to amount due, in the
absence of fraud which is not even hinted at in the pleadings or the depositions.
3. Is plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees?

A. ls the agreement sufficient?
The signed statement is that "purchaser agrees
to pay attorney fees, legal fees and all expenses involYed
in the event legal action is necessary for the collection
of the repair order." ( R-10) . The reference to it as a
repair order and not as a finalized bill on the face of
the document establishes a definite contract.
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Defendant questions the authority for the signature
in his brief. (Pages 14-15). In his deposition the defendant's only question was wether he should be bound
when a blank invoice is signed, although he was wrong
about this being a blank invoice. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 15-16; Clarence Osguthorpe Affidavit,
R29). An agent my bind his principal in a matter
incident to his recognized authority. Blashfield, Encyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Section 5034.
The person delivering the car has apparent authority
to bind the principal as to terms of repair. Blashfield,
Section 5104; Cotton vs. Garrell, 180 Mo. App. l18,
167 S"\V l187, Corpus Juris Secundum, Agency, Section 102.
Defendant, having received the repairs and the
bill, without objection to the agent's authority, has
ratified it, on principle of estoppel. C.J.S. Agency,
Section 29, Page 1063; 1'hompson vs. Collier-Reynolds,
155 Ark. 355, 244 S"\V 355; Dell Wood Tires vs. Miss,
(Mo. App.) 198 S'i\T 2nd 347, 353.

B. ls the proof sufficient?
At Pages 10 and 11 of his brief appellant attacks
the allowance of attorney fees and suggests that the
plaintiff offered no proof. At the hearing on November
15 the invoice which was Exhibit 1 was introduced in
evidence and the Court said: "If Mr. Bird were called
to testify would you agree $500.00 is a reasonable fee?
I think that is what he is asking for, isn't it?"
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Mr. Burton: "I think that is not in dispute."
Mr. Bird: "I calculated this at $597.00." (R-55)
Mr. Burton then went on to the matter of the Clarence
Osguthorpe affidavit and the Court then said: "Let's
get back to the attorney fee. \Vould you agree, if ht
testified, that there would be a reasonable fee?"
Mr. Burton: "I would." (R-56, Lines 26 to 29)
These stipulations were overlooked by the appe].
lant in his brief.
4. WM interest properly allowed?
Thi~ raises questions as to the amount of interest
and the time when it started. The complaint asked for
interest from February 10, 1967 ( R-2) and at the
maximum legal rate as provided by the contract (R-10).

1

1

Appellant's own authority on Page 9 of his brief
states that "in the absence of any circumstances indi·
eating a different intention an account is payable im·
mediately." The agreement here provided for interest
at maximum legal rate on all past due accounts (R-10).
Respondent, desiring to eliminate matters on which
there was a substantial issue, waived interest from Feb·
ruary through June for the reason that additional repair
work was done on the truck in June 1967. Rather than
commence interest immediately, interest was calculated
from the 10th of the following month, which it is sub·
mitted is a reasonable date for payment and commence·
ment of interest, there being no evidence of any com·
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1

munication to the plaintiff of the failure of the truck
to work satisfactorily in every way after the additional
work was done in June 1967 (Hellstrom Deposition,
Page 30).
There is no genuine issue as to due date of the
repair bill when work was completed February 27, 1967.
No complaint was made until plaintiff was called about
payment of the bill (Hellstrom Dep. P. 13). Every
question as to due date has been resolved to benefit
appellant.

CONCLUSION
Appellant points out no areas of genuine issue of
substantial fact. Appellant's unsupported statement
that there are issues for a jury trial does not raise a
"genuine issue."
The balance owing was fixed, the appellant assented to it by acquiescence and partial payment. There
is no basis for challenge of the authority of Clarence
Osguthorpe from any statement in the affidavit or
deposition. The payment ratified the authority and the
terms. The attorneys fees were resolved pursuant to
stipulation. The judgment should be confirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard L. Bird, Jr.
for Richards and 'Vatkins
Attorneys for plaintiff-respondent

15

